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IMPLEMENTING ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE




Many hardworking people from unprivileged backgrounds are automatically
disadvantaged simply because they lack access to financial capital. Observably,
microfinance provides a way out of the poverty trap if it is deployed
appropriately. Nigeria, like many other developing countries, has thus taken
up the challenge of developing inclusive microfinancing initiatives. In the
country, funding for small-scale businesses is available from both the
government and the private sector. Unfortunately, the nature and conditions
of the schemes fail to meet the sensitivities of a substantial group who would
otherwise have been eligible for the grants and loans. The practical implication
is that such group would be twice excluded from the financial system. These
potentially excluded groups are those poor Muslims who might desire funding
but are unable to benefit from the government schemes because the loan
conditions contradict their faith. It is argued that the effect of the status quo
is that it breeds further inequality and inequity and could even amount to
outright (or indirect) discrimination. This contention is substantiated through
constitutional analysis and also in light of a contemporary economic welfare
theory – the Capability Approach. The article argues that this marginalized
group has a right to Islamic microfinance. This right, it is further contended,
places justiciable (positive and negative) duty on the government. It, therefore,
calls that Islamic microfinance should forthwith be embedded into the fabric
of public governance in the country. The article demonstrates the exclusionary
problem by analysing some of the existing schemes, and it proffers alternative
sharia-compliant conditions for existing schemes.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The importance of financial inclusion to socio-economic development
has gained substantial recognition in recent times.1 Hence, though the
ratio of those excluded from financial services remains critically high,2
governments are increasingly directing their policies towards correcting
the problem of exclusion with the ultimate aim of lifting people out of
poverty.3 One of the measures used to achieve this laudable goal is
through the introduction of microfinance.4 While the true impact of
microfinance remains debatable,5 it, in principle, aims to lift some of
the underprivileged out of the poverty trap, especially if the financing
1 See e.g., C Park and R Mercado,‘Financial Inclusion, Poverty, and Income
Inequality in Developing Asia’ ADB Economics Working Paper Series Paper No.
426 (January 2015); A. Sharma, S. Kukreja, ‘An Analytical Study: Relevance of
Financial Inclusion for Developing Nations’ (2013) 2(6) International Journal of
Engineering and Science15-20.
2 This is especially true in sub-Saharan Africa where as at 2011, only about 5 per
cent of the people had access to loans. See F. Allen et al, ‘The African Financial
Development and Financial Inclusion Gaps’World Bank Development Research
Group Working Paper 7019, 2 (September 2014).
3 For example, there has been an increase in the number of people that have
transaction account. In 2011, only 42 pe rcent of adults had an account but by
2014, that number had increased to 54 per cent. See World Bank, ‘Universal
Financial Assess: Global Progress’<[http://ufa.worldbank.org/global-progress>
accessed 18 September 2016. Access to banking services has been noted as the
first step towards fighting problems such as poverty. See World Bank, ibid.
4 Microfinance has been recognized as one of the means for achieving financial
inclusion. See Sebastian-A Molineus, (Comment at the World Bank Research
department Policy Research Talk, March 2013) on the topic ‘Does Microfinance
Still Hold Promise for Reaching the Poor?’<www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2015/03/30/does-microfinance-still-hold-promise-for-reaching-the-
poor>accessed 18 September 2016. Contrast this with the opinion that
microfinance locks the poor in poverty trap. See M. Bateman and H. Chang,
‘Microfinance and the Illusion of Development: From Hubris to Nemesis in Thirty
Years’ (2012) 1 World Economic Review13-36.
5 Research shows that microfinance does harm but also improves the welfare of
the poor. See C. van Rooyen, R. Stewart, T. de Wet, ‘The Impact of Microfinance
in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Systematic Review of the Evidence’ (2012) 40(11)
World Development 2249–2262; A. Babajide ‘Effects of Microfinance on Micro
and Small Enterprises (MSEs) Growth in Nigeria’ (2012) 2(3) Asian Economic
and Financial Review 463-477; Bateman and Chang (n 4).
2016 IMPLEMENTING ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE IN NIGERIA 213
schemes are subsidized.6 Nigeria is one of the countries that have made
efforts to bolster the prospects of microfinance through government
subsidy schemes that are often implemented directly or in conjunction
with the private sector. Hence, perhaps now more than ever, there is
some level of support, which can bolster the opportunities for the
poorest as well as and small businesses with the real prospect of
changing lives.
Like the overall banking system in the country, the microfinance
system in Nigeria is firmly nested on the Western neo-classical economic
paradigm. Perhaps this owes much partly to its colonial past7 and partly
to the spate of globalization.8 Successive governments continue to
develop policies and practices based on the conventional finance model,
which appears to be fully embedded into the system. The present system
feels so normal that the unwary is likely to consider the status quo as
the only viable way to understand and run an economy (and by
extension, a microfinance system). However, experience elsewhere
shows that there is a viable alternative.9
The article stresses the imperativeness of embedding Islamic
microfinance into the Nigerian system. It contends that while such an
alternative might appear to be a matter of policy choice and priorities,
the circumstance in Nigeria makes it more of a public duty. Hence, the
absence of deep initiatives on Islamic microfinance should thus be
seen as a scandal. In a country with over 80 million Muslims, the
absence of an ingrained sharia-compliant financial machinery amounts
to a gross failing in governance.
The article, therefore, argues for the substantial overhauling of the
socio-economic policies that underlie Nigeria’s microfinance system.
The key to this exercise is the need to embed Islamic microfinance
6 M. Hudon and T. Traca, ‘Subsidies and Sustainability of Microfinance’Centre
Emile Bernheim Research Institute in Management Sciences Working Paper:
WP-CEB 06-020 (October 2010); J. Morduch, ‘The Role of Subsidies in
Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen Bank’ (1999) 60 Journal of
Development Economics 229-248.
7 O. Adeyeri and K. Adejuwon, ‘The Implication of British Colonial Economic Policies
on Nigeria’s Development’ (2012) 1(2)International Journal of Advanced Research
in Management and Social Sciences1-16.
8 Bateman and Chang (n 4) 30.
9 The experience of Sudan is particularly noteworthy. See E. Ahmed and A. Ammar,
‘Islamic Microfinance in Sudanese Perspective’ (2015) 4(3) Journal of Business
Finance Affair 149.
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partly because it will play a key role in achieving real welfare
advancements. Even more importantly, Islamic microfinance must be
embedded because (as would be argued) it keeps in line with the duty
to vindicate the inalienable rights of a substantial group. Failure to
take necessary action would raise serious issues of governance failure,
breach of fundamental rights, and (indirect) discrimination through
socio-economic exclusion. For example, the article contends that
governments’ policy prescriptions and initiatives, which do not
incorporate sharia-compliant principles, are not only insensitive but
also amount to a breach of justiciable rights. It is, therefore, imperative
for the Nigerian government to implement concrete measures to address
the present anomaly. The article will also suggest how present measures
and schemes can be modified.
To proceed with the task, the paper is divided into six sections.
Section 1 draws attention to the core issues emanating from the
microfinance policy in Nigeria. Section 2 establishes the constitutional
basis for the justiciability of the right to Islamic microfinance. Section
3 imbues the right to Islamic microfinance with substantive content
and identifiable economic welfare basis. I adopt the Capability Approach
(CA) for this purpose. Section 4 fuses the legal and economic basis for
Islamic microfinance while section 5 details potential ways to apply
Islamic microfinance principles by reviewing some of the government
schemes. Section 6 contains the conclusions.
2.  MICROFINANCE IN NIGERIA: THE
INEQUALITY DETERMINED
Despite its oil wealth and the fact that it is Africa’s largest economy,
many Nigerians are under the tight grip of poverty. Out of a population
of around 180 million, about 110 million are said to be living in abject
poverty.10 Inequality11 is rising at an alarming rate,12 and this is
10 The Country Director of the World Bank for Nigeria, Marie-Francoise Marie-Nelly,
disclosed this while delivering the World Banks’ Country Programme Portfolio
Review. See A. Adike, ‘Rising Inequality and the Challenge of Change in Nigeria’
(2014) 4(9) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 208-210.
11 There are different views on how to delineate principles of equity. It could mean:
‘fairness’ in distributions e.g. John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA, Harvard
University Press 1971); equal opportunity; treating people with equal concern and
respect e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge MA, Harvard
University Press, 1985); and that alike cases should be treated as alike.
12 Adike (n 10).
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particularly exacerbated by the lack of access to financial services for a
vast section of the public. It has thus become even more imperative
that policy initiatives are put in place to arrest the worrying trend.
Rightly, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 2012 initiated a bridging
drive termed the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS). Its
overall target is to reduce the number of adults excluded from financial
services from 46.3 per cent in 2010 to 20 per cent in 2020.13 The NFIS,
together with the Microfinance Policy, has led to some successes, as
there has been relative ease in the process of obtaining capital.14 A
direct evidence of this is that there are now over 1,000 microfinance
institutions (MFIs) operating in Nigeria.
Apart from its initiatives aimed at facilitating the growth of the
microfinance industry, the government has also provided funds for
microfinance banks. In 2015, the CBN injected N220 billion into the
microfinance sector at 9 per cent interest rate to MFIs. The CBN also
runs an agro-credit scheme, which provides guarantee cover to banks
who give loans to the farmers. Other initiatives include the Rural Banking
Programme, sectoral allocation of credits, and concessionary interest
rate.15 The government also created the National Poverty Eradication
Programme (NAPEP) with the mandate of providing financial services
to alleviate poverty.
To operationalize the different grants and developmental schemes,
the Nigerian government has established several development finance
institutions. They include the Bank of Industry (BOI), and the Federal
Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN). Also, there is the Infrastructure
Bank Plc,16 and the proposed Higher Education Bank. The pro-poor
institutional bodies also include the National Directorate of Employment
13 Stakeholders affirm commitment to the National Financial Inclusion Strategy
Implementation (2016) 1(1) Financial Inclusion Newsletter 1.
14 According to Tokunbo Martins, the Director, Banking Supervision Department
at CBN, the ratio of Nigerian with access to financial services has increased
from 40 to 60 per cent. See 57 million Nigerians now have access to financial
services – CBN (News24 Nigeria 16 Feb 2016)<www.news24.com.ng/National/
News/57-million-nigerians-now-have-access-to-financial-services-cbn-
20160212>. Accessed 18 September 2016
15 CBN, ‘Microfinance Policy, Regulatory, and Supervisory Framework for Nigeria
’(December 2005). <www.cenbank.org/Out/publications/guidelines/DFD/
2006/MICROFINANCE%20POLICY.pdf>accessed 18 September 2016
Hereinafter referred to as CBN Microfinance Policy.
16 Note that the government holds only a minority share in this establishment.
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(NDE), the Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC), and
the Bank of Agriculture (BOA), which has the mandate of enhancing
the provision of finance to the agricultural sector.
There are also initiatives from commercial banks to facilitate access
to funds. For example, a group of top commercial banks named the
‘Bankers’ Committee’ agreed to set aside 10 percent of their pre-tax
annual profit for equity investment in the microfinance sector. Keeping
to their promise, the Banker’s Committee promised to devote N300
billion to the SME sector in 2016.17
Some of the programmes do not merely provide funds; they also
facilitate skill acquisition, help to address marketing challenges, and
with regards to farmers, they help to reduce the post-harvest losses.
An indication of the overall drive to bridge the gap is reflected in the
fact that the BOI, for example, devotes 85 per cent of its resources to
SMEs while 15 per cent goes to large enterprises that have linkages
with small or medium enterprises. One of the BOI’s programmes is the
Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) scheme, which caters for the most
downtrodden. The institution disburses funds to the most deprived
through participating MFIs. The scheme leverages on the spread of
MFIs to maximize its reach.18
The Problem
Despite existing flaws and shortcomings, the deepening of the
microfinance sector in Nigeria has raised hope that the poverty trap
may gradually ebb off. Some commentators have thus recognized the
prospects of the industry in particular19 and the role it could play in
reviving the wider economy.20 However, while it appears on the surface
that the poverty reduction initiatives give fair opportunities to
17 Nigerian banks budget N300b loan to SMEs, agric sector (The News Nigeria 13
Dec 2015)<http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2015/12/nigerian-banks-budget-
n300b-loan-to-smes-agric-sector/>accessed 18 September 2016
18 BOI, ‘Bottom of the Pyramid Scheme’<www.boi.ng/wp-content/uploads/2015/
08/Bottom-of-the-Pyramid-.pdf>accessed 18 September 2016.
19 C. Anyanwu, ‘Microfinance Institutions in Nigeria: Policy, Practice and
Potentials’(Paper Presented at the G24 Workshop on ‘Constraints to Growth in
Sub Saharan Africa’ Pretoria, South Africa, 29-30 November, 2004).
20 C. Jegede, J. Kehinde, B. Akinlabi, ‘Impact of Microfinance on Poverty Alleviation
in Nigeria: An Empirical Investigation’ (2011) 2(1) European Journal of
Humanities and Social Sciences 97-111.
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potentially qualified candidates, the reality is more disturbing – all the
government programmes deploy a myopic microfinancing approach.
Practically all the funds available are channelled through interest-bearing
avenues. In this regard, it is worthy to note the observation of Brigit
Helm that to tackle poverty, ‘diverse approaches are needed. A one-
size fits-all solution will not work. Diverse channels are needed to get
diverse financial services into the hands of a diverse range of people
who are currently excluded. Making this vision a reality entails breaking
down the walls, real and imaginary, that currently separate microfinance
from the much broader world of financial systems.’21 This is why it is
quite baffling that the financial system in Nigeria has remained primarily
one-dimensional for so long. While there might have been sporadic
interest in developing alternative means of finance (such as Islamic
finance), no real effort was made to restructure the economic and
financial landscape.
The unwary might miss the problem here. For a country with a
(contested) Muslim population that constitute half (little more or little
less) of the overall population, the failure to diversify the microfinance
approaches amounts to more than mere blameworthy oversight. Rather,
it could indicate gross injustice. The Muslim’s Holy Quran forbids certain
financial dealings in the strongest terms.22 So it should not be a surprise
that some poor Muslims would still not consider the government
schemes as viable options. While some would feel helpless, and so
engage in such prohibited transactions even though their heart rejects
it, one cannot disregard the possibility of a significant section that
would not approach such avenues even if funds was offered to them at
a 0.01 per cent interest rate.23 One of the subtle effects of the
21 Brigit Helm, Access for All: Building Inclusive Financial Systems (World Bank
Group Publications, 2006) 2.
22 Quran 2: 275 states that ‘Those who eat Riba (usury) will not stand (on the Day
of Resurrection) except like the standing of a person beaten by Shaitan (Satan)
leading him to insanity. That is because they say: ‘Trading is only like Riba
(usury),’ whereas Allah has permitted trading and forbidden Riba (usury). So,
whosoever receives an admonition from his Lord and stops eating Riba (usury)
shall not be punished for the past; his case is for Allah (to judge); but whoever
returns [to Riba (usury)], such are the dwellers of the Fire - they will abide
therein’ Hilali and Khan’s interpretation of the meaning.
23 Note the survey conducted in one of the Northern states (Kano State). See A.
Muhammad and M. Zakaullah, ‘Applicability of Islamic Micro-Investment Model
in Kano State, Nigeria: Empirical Evidence’ (2013) 7(4) Australian Journal of
Basic and Applied Sciences 535-542.
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circumstance-induced exclusion is the social ‘deadweight loss’ it
generates. Statistical data or fancy formulas and micro-economic
indicators cannot capture the voice of those unknown Muslims. Yet,
they are important. Thus, one cannot seek to defeat the claim in this
paper by alluding to the lack of concrete proof of the existence of such
group of Muslims. It would simply be self-referential, antithetical, and
unintelligent for anyone to seek to undermine the plight of the
unnoticed by seeking empirical evidence of the existence of such a
group. A simple reference to the books of Islam, which abhors interest-
bearing financial transactions without qualification, should be sufficient
to prove that such group exists.
The preceding underscores the call for a restructuring exercise that
takes an ethnographic view of the different societies to ensure that a
truly inclusive economic agenda would have been more ideal.
Unfortunately, by the passage of time, the much needed economic
restructuring is becoming more of a distant dream. The successive
governments’ numbness to societal pulse may be attributable to
political factors some of which are unbecoming24 while some others
are outright ludicrous.25 Meanwhile, to the extent that it concerns Islamic
finance, the real impact of the lack of political will manifests itself
through the automatic exclusion (albeit indirectly) of a large group
simply because they are unable to compromise some of the core values
of their faith. Any government that is serious about the impact of its
policies should ensure that its initiatives meet the need of the diverse
section of its society as much as possible.26 This is especially so in
Nigeria which has such strong and diverse cultural and religious
communities.
The plight of the excluded poor Muslim is further heightened by
the relative inattention of, and inadequate pressure exerted by,
stakeholder organizations and individuals. The remainder of this section
will, therefore, stress briefly the core problem and the relatively
24 For example, mental laziness, status quo bias, corruption, ineptitude.
25 There is often unfounded fear that establishing Islamic banks is a step towards
‘Islamizing’ the country. See M. Yunusa and N. Bint Nordin, ‘Religious Challenges
of Islamic Banking in Nigeria’ (2015) 5 International Journal of Academic Research
in Business and Social Sciences 85.
26 The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services, The
Good Governance Standard for Public Services (OPM and CIPFA, 2004) 14.
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ineffective pressure exerted by a rather meagre section of the
stakeholders.
Core Problem
As earlier stated, both the public and private sectors can provide
microfinance. The arguments in this article are limited to policies and
actions of the public authority. Any reference to the private sector would
only be to substantiate issues relating to the policies and practices of
government agencies in addressing public-private initiatives. The
government’s duties can be broadly categorized into two: initiating
poverty alleviation programmes, and setting regulatory policies that
would facilitate private sector engagement in poverty alleviation
initiatives. The government has failed the significant Muslim population
on both accounts. Of the two, the failure concerning the poverty
alleviation programmes is more damning. Large amounts of the public
funds are often made available to help the less privileged. But then, for
no justifiable reason,27 the conditions often automatically exclude the
significant section of Muslims thereby negatively impacting on the socio-
economic, political, and civic balance in the country. The case of the
poor and financially excluded Muslim is particularly poignant as it brings
to the fore an entrenched failure of successive government’s economic
policies. The Quran and the Prophetic traditions, which prohibit certain
types of financial transactions, guide Muslims. Unfortunately, it is those
prohibited elements that are the cornerstone of the global financial
system. In effect, in the absence of suitable alternative, even if a section
of the poor require some form of assistance, the fact that conventional
microfinance is at variance with the injunction of their faith would
mean that they are more likely to stay away from such scheme. This
problem cannot be taken for granted as research shows that about 72
per cent of people living in the Muslim world do not use formal financial
services. Out of the meagre 28 per cent that do, more than 40 per cent
of them would not obtain microfinance loans because it involves paying
interest.28
27 A scheme can be targeted at a specific group thereby justifiably excluding
others. For example, a scheme targeted at training a group of promising students
or a scheme targeted at indigenes of a marginalized community.
28 N. Karim, M. Tarazi, and X. Reille, ‘Islamic Microfinance: An Emerging Market
Niche’ (2008) CGAP Focus Note No. 49.
220 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 7: 2: 2016
Indeed, the Nigerian government’s Microfinance Policy29 does not
prohibit the establishment of Islamic microfinance institutions in
Nigeria. Moreover, Islamic Microfinance Institutions (IMFIs) do exist
in Nigeria some of which are successful.30 Furthermore, the Central
Bank of Nigeria recently approved guidelines for Islamic micro-finance
banks in the country.31 So, is there much justification for the case being
made in this article? As it will be shown, the reality reveals a direr
picture than might initially appear.
Though rather sparing, some scholars have recognized the need
for proper Islamic microfinance system in Nigeria. For instance, Islamic
microfinance has been promoted because of its industry prospect.32
Some have also identified it as a key way to reduce endemic poverty
within poor Muslim communities.33 It has also been justified because
there is a very significant Muslim population in Nigeria.34
The existing literature in the area has aimed to showcase the value
of, and the need for, Islamic microfinance. Notably, this paper
approaches the question of Islamic microfinance in Nigeria from a much
firmer perspective. It contends that Islamic microfinance is not just
something to be considered, to be lobbied for, or done out of favour.
Rather, it is a right which gives rise to corresponding duties. Importantly,
therefore, the paper does not aim to justify the right to Islamic
microfinance by merely alluding to the religious constraints on Muslims
or by emphasizing the potential economic benefit from such initiative.
29 Published in 2005.
30 For an example of a successful IMFI in Nigeria, see T. Yusuf and A. Mobolaji, ‘The
Role of Islamic Micro Insurance in Economic Growth and Development: The
Nigerian Experience: A Case Study of Al-Barakah Microfinance Bank, Lagos’
(2012) 1(10) International Journal of Business and Commerce 106-122.
31 Central Bank of Nigeria, Guidelines on the Regulation and Supervision on Non-
Interest (Islamic) Microfinance Banks in Nigeria (11 May 2016).
32 See, A. Mohammed and H. Zubair, ‘Microfinance in Nigeria and the prospects
of introducing its Islamic version there in the light of selected Muslim countries’
experience’ MPRA Paper No. 8287, April 2008; A Dogarawa, ‘Financial Inclusion
in Nigeria and the Prospects and Challenges of Islamic Microfinance
Banks’(Conference Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Inclusive
Islamic Financial Sector. Sudan Academy for Banking and Financial Sciences.
Khartoum, Sudan, 9 October 2011).
33 M. Noibi, ‘Islamic Development Bank’s Microfinance Support Programme and
the Growth of Small Scale Enterprises in Nigeria’ (2014) 10(2) Canadian Social
Science 98-107.
34 CBN Guidelines (2016).
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Conclusively, the fact that such monumental problem has remained
unspoken for so long only goes to show how endemic and systemic
the problem is. The article will, therefore, focus more on government
microfinance scheme because of the gravity of the distributive concerns
that stems from wrongful policy formulation and implementation.
Evidencing the Problem
The scriptural evidence and common knowledge regarding the
abhorrence of interest-based and speculative transactions in Islam
should, in fact, be enough to substantiate the contention made in this
paper. Nevertheless, effort would be made to draw some verifiable
inferences from the Nigerian society to further strengthen the call for
action. For example, statistics on the penetration of MFIs across the
country would give a clue as to the enormity of the injustice caused by
the unsuitable terrain that results from the government’s financial
policies.
By studying the business demography for a particular industry, it is
possible to gather information that reveals numerous facts such as
demography of consumer take-up of goods and services.35 The
information on consumer take-up, for example, would naturally elicit
reaction businesses that would respond by either flocking to the areas
where consumer interests are high or flee from those places with
insignificant patronage.36 As such, by studying MFIs in Nigeria, it is
possible to observe a pattern that lends itself to the claim already
made in this paper.
The spread of MFIs in Nigeria already tell the story of areas where
customer interest is high and areas with very low customer interest. It
so happens that Muslims mainly or overwhelmingly populate the states
with potentially very low patronage. This is most evident in the fact
that Kano, one of Nigeria’s most populous states with a predominantly
Muslim population, has only five Microfinance banks despite being a
commercial hub while another commercial hub, Anambra (a southern
35 V. Cook, J. Larréché, E. Strong, Readings in Marketing Strategy (Beaconsfield,
Scientific Press, 1989) 176. The importance of demographics has also been
addressed in the context of Islamic banks. See M. Rashid, M. Hassan, ‘Customer
Demographics Affecting Bank Selection Criteria, Preference, and Market
Segmentation: Study on Domestic Islamic Banks in Bangladesh’ (2009) 9(6)
International Journal of Business and Management 131-146.
36 ibid.
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state with very few Muslim population and a total population less
than half the population of Kano), has 75 microfinance banks. The
spread of MFIs is very consistent with the hypothesis that poor Muslims
in Nigeria are averse to conventional microfinance.
Even where the contrast is not as sharp, a similar pattern that
proves the hypothesis still emerges. For example, Lagos State, with
one of the largest populations in the country, has the lion’s share of
MFIs totalling 180. Though the majority of Lagos indigenes are
Muslims,37 the actual inhabitants of the state are very diverse with a
substantial number of those inhabitants being from other southern
states with a rather insignificant Muslim population. The high number
can thus be attributed to the substantial presence of non-Muslims in
the state. A similar explanation applies to Abuja, the country’s capital.
Furthermore, in comparison to other predominantly Muslim-populated
states in the North, Katsina has a relatively high number of MFIs (22).
This higher number is consistent with the hypothesis considering that
Kaduna has a relatively higher non-Muslim minority. All other states
that have very minimal non-Muslim population have extremely low
numbers of MFIs. To put into perspective, the North-West and North-
East of Nigeria which contains roughly half the population of Nigeria
and has an overwhelmingly Muslim population has less than 10 percent
of the microfinance banks operating in the country, yet the region has
a higher poverty level.38 How really can anyone justify public
disbursements aimed at poverty eradication but yet manage to exclude
such high population of the poor tacitly?
Perhaps it might be argued that the apathy in the predominantly
37 Lagos, New World Encyclopaedia<www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/
Lagos>accessed 18 September 2016.
38 Based on report from Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics, the poorest
geopolitical zone is the Northwest on the average, 71.4 per cent of the people
are poor. It is followed by the Northeast region, which has 69.1 per cent and the
North central region, which has 60.7 per cent. Muslims overwhelmingly populate
the three zones. Out of the 10 poorest states, eight of them have an
overwhelming Muslim population. Sokoto, the seat of the Islamic authority in
Nigeria, is the poorest state in Nigeria with a staggering 81.2 per cent of its
population living in poverty. See Editorial, ‘Here is The List of Top (10) Poorest
States in Nigeria’(Daily Mail Nigeria 31 March 2016)<http://dailymail.com.ng/
list-top-10-poorest-states-nigeria/> accessed 20 September 2016.
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Muslim-populated states is more as a result of their economic docility.39
Such contention would be rather uncharitable given that the economic
system could very well have shaped their perceived ‘docility’ even
before they were born.40
By inference, it is fair to say that the direct initiatives and the
guarantee schemes ran by the government have not benefited the poor
in Muslim-dominated communities. The issue addressed has to be
taken seriously as this article argues that it is not a matter that gives
room for policy discretion. Rather, refusal to introduce a corresponding
microfinancing mechanism aimed at absorbing the excluded segment
should be seem as a gross violation and total failure of responsibility
for which the government should be held culpable.
It is reiterated that the argument presented in this article should
not be understood as compelling private financial institutions to
diversify their approaches such as introducing Islamic microfinance.41
Rather, the focus is on government’s usage of public funds and its
approach to financial policy formulation. This, it is argued, creates a
justiciable constitutional duty.
3.  CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR ISLAMIC
MICROFINANCE
Similar to most democratic systems, Nigerian has enshrined in its
constitution some provisions, which detail the responsibilities of the
state and the rights of individuals. For example, the government is
expected to aim at some economic and social objectives. There are
also provisions detailing the inalienable rights of the citizens.42 Regarding
the economic right of citizens, section 16 (1) of the 1999 Constitution
39 See G. Eze, Understanding Poverty (Onitsha, Good Time Press, 2011); Herbert
Spencer,‘Report on Poverty in Northern Nigeria. Concepts, Causes and
Alleviation Strategies’ (1971) referred to in J. Aderonmu, ‘Local Government
and Poverty Eradication in Rural Nigeria’ (2010) 6(5) Canadian Social Science
200-208. Spencer described the poor as ‘bad fellows’, good for nothing, vagrants
and sots’.
40 See Kuren,‘Report on Poverty in Northern Nigeria. Concepts, Causes and
Alleviation Strategies’ (1978) referred to in Aderonmu (n 39).
41 However, where an MFI serves as the outlet for disbursing government funds,
then it would have to apply sharia-compliant principles.
42 Chapter 4 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended).
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requires the government to control the economy in such a way that
secures the maximum welfare, freedom, and happiness of every citizen
on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity.43
Section 16(2) further requires the state to direct its policy towards
ensuring the promotion of a planned and balanced economic
development.44 It also requires the government to ensure that the
material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed as best
as possible to serve the common good.45 The social objectives enshrined
in section 17 of the Constitution also confirm the ethos of the Nigerian
state. It affirms that the social order of the country is founded on the
ideas of freedom, equality, and justice.46 It further provides that ensuring
equality of rights, obligations and opportunities for every citizen before
the law should vindicate the social order.47 Also, it provides for the
maintenance and enhancement of the sanctity and dignity of the human
person.48 Section 17(3)49 guards against discriminatory practices against
any group regarding the opportunity afforded to them for securing
adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity to secure
suitable employment. Finally, the provision mandates the state to
provide public assistance in deserving cases.50
The constitutional provisions stated above help to illuminate the
concerns emanating from the constructive exclusion of Muslims from
Nigeria’s economic fabric. In light of the arguments proffered so far
and the preceding constitutional provisions, it can be said that the
Nigerian state’s failure to entrench Islamic finance principles into the
functioning of the public service means that their policies are not
directed towards ensuring a planned and balanced economic
development. The effect of such policy failings includes the potential
domination of a group over another, which naturally results in a backlash









51 See C. Kwajah, ‘Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict’ (2011)
14 African Security Brief 2. He noted that ‘the ethnic or religious dimensions of
the conflict have subsequently been misconstrued as the primary driver of
violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement, inequality, and other practical fears
are the root causes’.
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source of conflict and insecurity.52 In a similar vein, this failure amounts
to a form of indirect discrimination, which goes against the spirit of
section 17(3)(a) of the Nigerian Constitution. To correct such anomaly,
it is imperative that the government embrace its positive duties by
promoting equality of opportunities as mandated in section 17(2)(a)
of the Constitution.
While many would recognize and accept the constitutional duties
detailed above, others may consider those provisions as merely
aspirational and, hence, mere suggestions that help to shape the
discretion of government agents in the performance of the policy making
tasks.53 A relatively moderate view would be that those provisions
confer rights, but those rights are non-justiciable.54 One of the arguments
that are often made to justify these types of claims is that provisions
on socio-economic rights address issues of policy which judges are not
well equipped to handle.55 This excuse will find support in the section
6(6)(c) of the Constitution as interpreted by the court in Arch Bishop
Olubunmi Okogie v The Lagos State.56 However, such literal interpretation
of the Constitution would fly in the face of the reality in many parts of
the globe. Moreover, it would be contrary to positions taken in some
recent court decisions in or about Nigeria. For example, the ‘right to
education’ which has great socio-economic implication was ruled by
the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) court to be
justiciable in line with the Art 4(g) of the ECOWAS Treaty to which
Nigeria is a signatory.57 Also, the High Court in Falana v A.G Federation58
52 G. Brown and F. Stewart, ‘Economic and Political Causes of Conflict: An Overview
and Some Policy Implications’ CRISE Working Paper No. 81 (February 2015) 24.
53 See  A. Ojo, ‘Constitution and Constitutional Changes in Nigeria since
Independence’ in J. Atanda and A. Aliyu (eds) Political Development(Proceedings
on the National Conferences on Nigeria since Independence (Zaria, Gaskiya
Corporation Ltd, 1985) 116-135.
54 For a contrary and more contemporary view, see I. Trispiotis, ‘Socio-economic
Rights: Legally Enforceable or Just Aspirational?’ (2010) 8 Opticon 1826.
55 See  Constitution Drafting Committee of the 1979 Constitution.
56 (1981) 2NCLR 337 at 350. See also AG Ondo v AG Federation (2002) 9 NWLR
(Pt 772), 222.
57 SERAP vs Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission
ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08.
58 Editorial, ‘Court orders Nigerian Government to re-establish People’s Bank’
(Premium Times, Nigeria 3 June 2014)<www.premiumtimesng.com/news/
163502-court-orders-nigerian-government-re-establish-peoples-bank.html>
accessed 20 September 2016.
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ordered the government to re-open the bank dedicated to providing
soft loans for the poor.59
Regardless of the purported terms that render certain provisions
non-justiciable, it is possible to establish a justiciable claim on some
issues that somewhat have socio-economic welfare implications without
relying exclusively on sections 16 and 17. It is contended that giving
the present circumstance, context, and broader implications, Islamic
microfinance should be recognized as one of such issues which have
strong socio-economic welfare implication but nevertheless justiciable
because of its link to some fundamental rights. This would mean that
the right to Islamic finance could be invoked under part 4 of the 1999
Constitution, which enshrines fundamental rights. This is because the
argument for Islamic microfinance is not merely a claim about how
scarce public resources should be utilized. Rather, it also concerns how
already approved financial intervention policy initiatives should be
conceptualized, actualized and implemented in the spirit of fairness,
equality/equity, and justice.
The government owes poor Muslims negative and positive duties
to provide Islamic microfinance as an alternative to conventional
microfinance. Failure to uphold these obligations can be challenged
on two broad grounds. First, the government can be shown to have
flouted the Federal Character Act. Secondly, in light of developments
in international human right and the contemporary ideas of freedom,
government’s shortcomings could very well offend the inalienable rights
of the poor Muslims in Nigeria. The latter argument is more
comprehensive and substantive while the former provides a procedural
and statutory basis for substantiating the socio-economic injustice.
Hence, the first justification will be briefly addressed in the next
paragraph while the second justification would be fully elaborated upon
in the next section.
Federal Character
Given that the absence of Islamic microfinance has a marginalizing
effect, which dents the socio-economic balance of the country, it is the
duty of the government, through its relevant agency – the Federal
Character Commission – to problematize this issue and facilitate the
necessary changes. Section 4(1)(d) of the Federal Character Act 1996
59 The law that justified the ruling was however repealed in 2015.
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renders unacceptable any contention that policy prescriptions cannot
be subjected to judicial review. The section requires the Commission
to set an equitable formula for the distribution of socio-economic
services, amenities, and infrastructural facilities.60 It also mandates the
Commission to establish modalities and schemes for redressing the
alleged imbalances and reducing the fear of relative deprivation and
marginalization in the Nigerian system of federalism.61 The Commission
is also empowered to intervene in the operation of any agency of the
Federal Government, which carries out a function relevant to that of
the Commission but the latter is concerned that the function is not
being effectively implemented.62 It also has the mandate to advise the
Federal, State, and Local Governments to intervene and influence
providers of services, goods and socio-economic amenities to extend
such services, goods and socio-economic amenities to deprived areas
of the country.
Though nothing should stop a direct claim against agencies involved
in financial policy formulation (e.g., CBN), it would appear equally
prudent to rely on such extant law that provides an uncontroverted
basis for challenging the imbalance. As a body established by law, which
has a primary aim of maintaining socio-economic balance, there can
be no objection to the fact that the concerns raised in this article can
be the subject of a judicial review63 claim against the Federal Character
Commission. Conclusively, therefore, even from a purely ‘black letter’
perspective, the claim for the introduction of Islamic microfinance
principles in the implementation of government schemes is justiciable.
4.  RIGHT TO SHARIA-COMPLIANT CONDITIONS
FOR PUBLIC INITIATIVES
To successfully establish the need for Islamic microfinancing principle
in Nigeria, one would have to go beyond merely identifying the legal
procedural basis for such claim. This is because despite its justiciability,
such right can still be treated as being of second-order status. Such
60 Federal Character Act, s. 4(1)(d)(i).
61 ibid s4(1)(d)(ii).
62 ibid s 4(1)(e).
63 I. Udofa, ‘The Power of Judicial Review in the Promotion of Constitutionalism in
Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects’ (2015) 40 Journal of Law, Policy and
Globalization 192-205.
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treatment is especially possible if the fundamental rights, which underlie
the claim of Islamic microfinance, are understood in the traditional
sense – as granting mere negative rights.64 For example, if the right to
dignity of the human person is understood simply as a right against
harassment, then the state and other citizens might be shown to have
fulfilled their obligation by not harassing such a person. Such
interpretation of the right might not be sufficient for establishing a
compelling case against government’s complicity where for example,
they fail to provide adequate security, which emboldened some citizens
to harass others. In a similar vein, though the previous section details
the reasons for, and the legal basis warranting the introduction of,
Islamic microfinance principles, it would appear sufficient that the
state’s duty has been fulfilled if it can be shown that the government
has not directly acted against the right.
If the standard of proof needs to establish breach, government’s
actions or policies must directly negate the right to Islamic microfinance,
the potency of the right would be weakened. This is more so as the
motive for actions and policies can be effectively cloaked underneath
some seemingly important ideals. Moreover, breach might be even more
difficult to prove as cogent evidence might be required to link the
government’s actions and policies to the hardship faced by the identified
group. While one might be able to gather some form of evidence (i.e.,
through interviews, focus groups and so on), the weight of such evidence
can be compromised if the authorities simply allude to a different set
of evidence. For example, they might aim to establish that the hardship
faced by the identified group results from other factors, which the
government would or is already tackling. In other words, one might
have to establish a watertight counterfactual by demonstrating a likely
standard of living that the deprived group would have had if government
policies and actions had been more sensitive to their plight. Depending
on the standard of proof required, such an approach to human right
might dis-incentivize legitimate claims and also help to perpetuate the
status quo.65 On the other hand, if fundamental rights are seen to entail
64 See generally, Seth Kreimer, ‘Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State’ (1984) Faculty Scholarship Paper 1413.
65 See L. Kaplow, ‘Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable
Behaviour’ (2011) 101(3) American Economic Review 277-80; ‘On the Optimal
Burden of Proof’ (2011) 119 Journal of Political Economy 1104-1140.
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positive duties, a breach can be more easily established by alluding to
inaction or inadequate actions on the part of the authorities.66
From the foregoing, we can ground a claim for the implementation
of Islamic microfinance on the need to vindicate the fundamental right
to dignity of human person or right to equal/equitable treatment. The
negative duty may be shown to have been breached by alluding to the
state of abject poverty within the excluded group. The positive duty
might be shown to have been breached by alluding to the government’s
inattentiveness towards the task of embedding Islamic microfinance
principles into policy initiatives that are targeted at the poor. It would
be necessary from the outset to establish how such negative and
positive duties are linked to the right to human dignity. The positive
duties can be justified by the fact that the availability of sharia-compliant
avenues would enable the twice excluded group to participate in
government sponsored/managed microfinance schemes, thereby saving
them from the indignity that results from poverty. Such claims are
indeed worthy as Vizard et al note that ‘[t]he critical role of the idea of
human dignity in ethical thinking about human rights, and the
importance of viewing human rights as having legitimacy and validity
within the ethical domain (rather than as simply being the ‘products’
of legal and institutional arrangements) are … important themes.67
Indeed, some courts have managed to tease out positive justiciable
rights from seeming socio-economic issues successfully. The South
African and Indian experiences are especially worthy of note. In the
South African case of Khosa v Minister for Social Development,68 the
exclusion of permanent residents from the social housing scheme was
challenged. The court held that such policy was unconstitutional
because it offended the principle of equality and human dignity. The
court had succeeded in indirectly pronouncing on an issue that is
primarily about socio-economic right by vindicating the claim through
66 See C. Gamzhi, ‘Challenges of Enforcement of Fundamental Human Right under
the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 1999’ (Dissertation submitted
to the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies)<www.nials-nigeria.org/
projects CHALLENGES%20OF%20ENFORCEMENT%20PROJECT.pdf>
accessed 20 September 2016.
67 P. Vizard, S. Fukuda-Parr, and D. Elson, ‘Introduction: The Capability Approach
and Human Rights’ in Vizard et al (eds) Human Right and the Capability Approach
(London, Routledge, 2011) 2.
68 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC).
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civil and political rights.69 Similarly, the Indian Supreme Court had
established positive obligations such as prevention of malnutrition
and starvation and the provision of life-saving medicines through the
right to life provision in its Constitution.70
The foregoing notwithstanding, in the midst of numerous pressures
which governments face, it might appear unfair and unrealistic to hold
governments responsible simply because a group’s religious and cultural
needs have not been fully met. We might be tempted to argue that the
group would have to live with the consequence of their choice, which
has nothing to do with the objectively formulated government policies.
Even if the cultural and religious preferences of such group are in
principle respected, a ready excuse might be presented perhaps that
the embedding of Islamic microfinance principles would require some
overhaul which might destabilize the financial system. Where such
excuses are tendered, it would most likely be because of the perception
that the vindication of individual preferences is not of the most
important of the government’s responsibilities. Such perception would
endure so long as individual preferences and choices (not aggregated,
the paternalistic idea of societal preferences) are dissociated from the
relevant factors that determine the socio-economic welfare of society.
Even if the authorities appreciate the importance of individual
preferences and choices in formulating socio-economic policies, they
might pursue it with relatively lower vigour, especially when they are
unsure of the potential economic consequence. Moreover, even if the
government in power is fully convinced of the need to re-characterize
its perception of socio-economic welfare by showing sensitivity to the
individual preferences and choices of the people, such momentum could
simply plunge when a new government arrives. Furthermore, if there
is a clear duty that incumbent governments should have a clear Islamic
microfinance strategy, a government without a political will could surely
work around the grey ambits of the law to sabotage the intensity at
which such policy is being embedded. To avoid such political
shenanigans, it is imperative to set the minimum standard at which
the positive duty of embedding Islamic microfinance would have to be
pursued. Such standard would effectively diminish elements of political
69 See also President of South Africa v Modderklip Broedery SA 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC).
70 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others (1981)
1 SCC 608.
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discretion that could be exercised unfavourably.
From the economic perspective, the claim for the infusion of Islamic
microfinance principles, which reflects individual preferences and
choices, can be articulated through the liberal concept of the Capability
Approach (CA). However, to concretize its relevance for this task, effort
would be made to align the relevant aspects of CA with Islamic
microfinance through the language of rights. Thus, the next section
would be dedicated to substantiating the CA as a contemporary
economic welfare paradigm which meets the poverty alleviation drive
in Nigeria and as such provides a firm basis for Islamic microfinance.
The section will also seek to strengthen the legal basis for Islamic
microfinance further by stressing the link between CA and international
human right.
5.  FUSING THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL BASIS
FOR ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE
As already noted, an economic paradigm in Nigeria is simply tailored
to the neo-classical school which paternalistically prescribes a universal
idea of ‘the good’ for every society.71 The theory suggests that policies
should be based on measurable ideals and advocates against non-
measurable standards as the basis for formulating economic policies.72
The preferred measurable metrics accepted by many proponents of
this school of thoughts are money and wealth (unlike other standards
such as happiness, preference, freedom and so forth). These preferences
are based on the argument that the only measurable standards are
those standards that can be objectively determined.73 It also believes
that wealth inherently drives every human being.74 It should be noted
though that some of its proponents recognize the value of societal
welfare. However, they maintain their preference for the former by
71 On the paternalistic nature of neo liberalism, see J. Soss, R Fording and S.
Schram, Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of
Race (Illinois, University of Chicago Press, 2011).
72 R. Nadeau, ‘Neoclassical Economic Theory’ The Encyclopaedia of
Earth<www.eoearth.org/view/article/154813/>accessed 20 September
2016.
73 See generally J. Klick and F. Parisi, ‘Wealth, Utility, and the Human Dimension’
(2005) 1(1) NYU Journal of Law and Liberty590-608.
74 ibid.
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contending that encouraging and facilitating the inherent selfishness
of man could best attain overall societal welfare.75 This is because, as
they argue, self-seeking attitude is the ‘rational choice’ for the economic
man.76 The implication of this theory is that policymakers applying
this ideal will be completely blinded to factors and issues that cannot
be assigned some direct monetary value. Hence, justifying Islamic
microfinance on the basis of perceived need to vindicate fairness and
freedom (as reflected through preferences and choices) for the poor
would appear to staunch neo-classicalists as unintelligent.77 Even when
such theorists find compelling evidence that disparages the monolithic
neo-classical ideal (such as the resulting distributive injustice), they
often explain things out through various bouts of misdiagnosis or they
focus on other parts of the problem. Some of the problems that are
often used as convenient distraction include claims of market failure,
lack of public awareness, corruption, lack of technical expertise, etc. –
everything but the paradigm is blamed. They then usually propose
makeshift curative prescriptions.78
However, though the neo-classical paradigm has dominated the
global economic landscape for a long time, more responsive welfare
approaches have also been developed. Particularly of note is the CA,
which allows for a progressive framework for welfare analysis. It has
been widely used especially by the United Nations as the framework
for setting agendas and goals on issues concerning development and
sustainability.79 This approach is premised on the idea that wealth is
not an end in itself. Rather, it is only needed to achieve something
else.80 The methodological focus of the CA thus necessarily results in a
75 J. Nelson, ‘Poisoning the Well, or How Economic Theory Damages Moral
Imagination’ Institute for New Economic Thinking Research Note No17 (28 Oct
2012). Contrast this with C. Snowdon, Selfishness, Greed and Capitalism:
Debunking Myths about the Free Market (London, Institute for Economic Affairs,
2015).
76 ibid.
77 See the argument in G. Zatzman and R. Islam, Economics of Intangibles (Nova
Science Publishers, 2007)
78 Unfortunately, conventional microfinance is one of such palliatives.
79 UNDP, Human Development Report: International Cooperation at a Crossroad –
Trade and Security in an Unequal World (New York, UNDP, 2005).
80 Amartya Sen ‘Well-being Agency and Freedom’ (1985) Journal of Philosophy
203; ‘Capability and Well-being’ in M Nussbaum and A Sen, The Quality of Life
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993).
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distinct theoretical view, which, if applied, will result in policy
prescriptions that are markedly different from those, influenced by
utilitarianism.81
The CA is a flexible concept, which could be expressed and applied
to various instances. The aspects of the CA that are most relevant for
vindicating Islamic microfinance in Nigeria is its conception of welfare
and the idea of ‘the good’, its broad methodological paradigm, and the
way it facilitates inclusiveness. The remainder of this section will
therefore briefly explain the CA and explore how it provides the
economic basis for Islamic microfinance in Nigeria. Afterwards, an
attempt will be made to link the more inclusive paradigm to human
right thereby solidifying the legal argument for Islamic microfinance.
CA and Islamic Microfinance
The CA is a broad normative framework for the evaluation of individual
well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies and proposals
about social change in society.82 It is concerned with evaluating a
person’s advantage in terms of his or her actual ability to achieve various
valuable functioning as a part of living. It is used for aggregative
appraisals as well as for the choice of institutions and policies. It must,
however, be noted that the capability approach does not constitute a
goal in itself. The CA thus merely serves as a platform for juxtaposing
the various interests and values. One of its strengths lies in its
application in a wide range of fields. It can be used to evaluate a variety
of aspects of people’s well-being, such as individual well-being,
inequality, and poverty.83 In evaluating a person’s advantage, CA focuses
on what people are effectively able to do and to be. As would be shown
presently, it places primary focus on individuals. Sen who stated that
by focusing on what people can do and be and on the quality of their
lives, we ensure for them more freedom to live the kind of life, which,
upon reflection, they find valuable, founded the concept. He states
that:
81 B. Herguner, In Pursuit of Equity: The Capability Approach and Education
(2012) 2(5) Public Policy and Administration Research 22-28.
82 I. Robeyns, ‘Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey’ (2005) 6 Journal of
Human Development 94.
83 R. Hick, ‘The capability approach: Insights for a new poverty focus’ (2012)
Journal of Social Policy.
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[T]he capability approach to a person’s advantage is concerned
with evaluating it in terms of his or her ability to achieve various
valuable functioning as a part of living. The corresponding
approach to social advantage – for aggregative appraisal as well
as for the choice of institutions and policy – takes the set of
individual capabilities as constituting an indispensable and central
part of the relevant informational base of such evaluation.84
Well-being is thus to be assessed in terms of people’s capabilities
to function. Assessing people’s ‘achieved functioning’ requires that we
focus our evaluative exercise on their effective opportunities to
undertake the actions and activities that they want to engage in, and
to be the person they want to be. In reaching a finding about what a
person seeks to be, CA recognizes ‘that different people, cultures and
societies may have different values and aspirations.’
We extend our focus to opportunities under the CA because it
affords versatility; it is more general and more informationally inclusive
than merely relying on achieved functioning. Sen argues that there is
no loss in looking at the broader informational base of capabilities,
which allows us not to rely merely on the valuation of achieved
functioning. Rather, it also allows for evaluation on the basis of priorities
such as opportunity and choice.85
The implication of choice is that even where two persons have
identical capability set, they are likely to choose different vectors from
their effective options, especially where they have varied ideas on what
constitutes a good life. Consequently, the two persons may end up
with different types and levels of achieved functioning depending on
the extent to which prevailing policies reflect the functioning chosen
by each individual. Hence, emphasizing the need to respect the
difference in opinion on what constitutes a good life, Sen argues that
it is capability, not achieved functioning, which should be the
appropriate political goal of institutions.86
Addressed in the context of issues underlying the call for Islamic
microfinance in Nigeria, we can categorize the different schemes run
by the BOI, BOA, and the various microfinance banks as constituting
84 Sen (n 80) 30.
85 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press,
2009) 236.
86 ibid.
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the capability set aimed at lifting the economically disadvantaged
citizens out of the poverty trap. Each of the schemes can be termed a
‘functioning’. Assuming there are two poor persons in need of funds.
Let us assume further that both of them are economically active and
that they are well informed about the various avenues open to them.
It is possible that the two persons would perceive their capability set
very differently such that the chosen vector of the functioning of each
person varies completely. If one of the two is open to any form of a
financing arrangement that has the prospect of lifting him out of the
trap, then it is likely that such a person would have a full set containing
all the options and might perhaps only rank the functioning based on
the economic terms and conditions attached. However, if the another
person applies a different standard in the assessment of the same
capability set (i.e., Islamic standard), it may end up that in an apparent
midst of plenty, they actually have no active functioning at all!
Regardless of the foregoing argument, if we view the schemes and
palliatives presented by the government and private actors as the
ultimate measure of opportunity, one would be hard-pressed to take
account of the welfare implication that results from individual choices.
A devout Hindu man’s starvation is not solved by an excess supply of
beef. It would also not be of any value to organize ‘eat-in’ lunch in a
Muslim populated neighbourhood during the month of Ramadan. While
hunger might, in general, be considered a sign of deprivation, the
stomach that does not go hungry in the month of Ramadan without
justifiable excuse, and the community may consider this as not only
deprived of good but also depraved. In the same sense, microfinancing
options that might appear juicy might in fact not appear as an option
at all.
The foregoing reveals that any policy maker that denies the
importance of choice, beliefs and culture and fails to recognize their
impact on (perception of) welfare might be unable to escape culpability.
This is why Sen stated that capabilities (as reflected in the true options
that exist within the capability set), and not achieved functioning,
should be the appropriate political goal of institutions.
It is imperative therefore that we understand the connection
between well-being and individual freedom (as expressed through
preference and choice). The idea of individual freedom, under the CA,
contains two aspects: the opportunity aspect and process aspect. The
opportunity aspect of freedom means that individuals should have
more opportunities to pursue their objectives so that they can live, as
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they would like and to promote the ends that they may want to advance.
The process aspect requires that individuals be able to achieve what
they value while also paying due regard to the process through which
that achievement comes about. By providing concrete avenues for
attaining welfare, authorities could very well claim to have met the
‘opportunity’ aspect of freedom. The process aspect, however, requires
that the means of accessing the vector(s) of functioning should facilitate
the attainment of well-being rather than hamper it.
The foregoing puts beyond doubt that the CA provides ‘a strong
justification for the promotion of interpersonal equity in the space of
basic capabilities’.87 Failure to meet this process aspect completely
defeats the gains or claims that can be made regarding the opportunity
aspect. In effect, it is grossly insufficient to initiate microfinance schemes
(opportunity) when the process of obtaining it is so averse to a person
(or group’s) perception of welfare that the ‘opportunity’ is seen as
toxic.
Nevertheless, a legitimate concern that might be expressed is that
the multiplicity of interest in a society might lead to an infinite list.
The broader the list, the more difficult it would be to justify why a
specific functioning such as Islamic microfinance should be paid due
attention. Theorists who acknowledge the huge opportunity costs of
fulfilling some capabilities have addressed this concern. They have thus
suggested that stakeholders should focus on sets of co-realizable
capabilities.88 It is contended that introducing Islamic microfinance is
a co-realizable capability given that all that might need to be done is
to set-up appropriate channels for assessing already existing schemes.
Moreover, as earlier mentioned, the welfare-enhancing effect of Islamic
microfinance, as revealed through the CA, has strong constitutional
relevance. It would thus be appropriate to tie the CA to human right
as this would help set the threshold for ascertaining whether claims
are realizable.
CA and Human Right
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights codifies some human rights
87 D. Clark, ‘Capability Approach’ in D. Clark (ed) Elgar Companion of Development
Studies (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006) 41.
88 B. Williams, ‘Standard of Living: Interest and Capabilities’ in G. Hawthorn (ed)
The Standard of Living (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987) 98-
100.
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which states are obliged to fulfil or respect. Those rights can be
categorized into two; civil and political rights and socio-economic and
cultural rights. There are also rights such as equality and non-
discrimination, which are considered to be free standing. The socio-
economic and cultural rights are given more expression in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Art
2.1 of the Covenant requires states to achieve the progressive realization
of the identified rights to the ‘maximum of available resources’. The
vindication of these rights, it has been shown, helps to establish global
responsibility towards poverty alleviation.89
In similar light, Sen’s Capability Approach provides an economic
welfare approach that equally attempts to arrest the spate of global
poverty through the ‘human development paradigm’. There is thus a
visible link between human right-influenced global responsibility on
poverty alleviation and the CA-influenced human development
paradigm.90 More so, it has been empirically established that human
right protection constitutes a key public policy variable that can
significantly influence the capabilities of individuals and groups.91
The synergy between human right and CA led to a call for a ‘human
rights-based development paradigm’ which gives rise to the Right to
Development.92 The ultimate goal of this right, according to Sengupta,
is to expand substantive freedoms rather than focus on narrow
informational metrics such as utility or growth. The CA’s influence on
human right is that it gives relevance to perspectives, which helps to
isolate (inconspicuous) human right challenges. For example, the right
to education might be implemented through a free education scheme,
but the right may then be shown to be breached where no concrete
action is taken against child labour. This unique HR perspective is
established by paying attention to the effect of the right on the
substantive position of individuals and groups. The effect can be tested
89 M. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2007).
90 Sen noted that ‘process-freedoms’ and ‘opportunity-freedoms’ that meet a
threshold of ‘importance’ can be termed as human rights. He also recognised
that many human rights can be explained through capabilities. See Sen (n 86)
367-372.
91 A. Sengupta, ‘Poverty Eradication and Human Right’ in Thomas Pogge (ed),
Freedom From Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?
(Oxford, OUP, 2007).
92 ibid.; Vizard et al (n 67), 10.
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by assessing how a measure affects the cultural practices and norms of
a person or group.93
The foregoing has a direct relevance to the argument for an Islamic
microfinance in Nigeria. The link between microfinance and human
development is well established.94 The special case for Islamic
microfinance as a necessary ingredient for human development has
also been detailed in preceding sections of this article. The excluded
group of Muslims would have felt the positive impact if the relevant
public authorities are held duty bound to introduce Islamic microfinance
as a means of reversing the systemic (intentional or non-intentional)
discrimination and equalizing the inequalities embedded in the status
quo. However, the foregoing notwithstanding, the concern remains that
even if stakeholders recognize the welfare implication as well as the
legal duty to establish Islamic microfinance, it might be difficult to
hold any one governmental agency accountable for breach. This is where
the human-right-based development paradigm can help avoid any
potential accountability deficit.95
Codifying the Principles of Islamic Microfinance
As established above, poor Muslim groups have a right to access finance
through Islamic microfinance to realize their welfare needs. The
vindication of this right is also important because of the equality and
discrimination concerns that arise in the absence of suitable financing
avenues. Given the seriousness of the issue surrounding Islamic finance,
the weight of responsibility on the government would be centred on
the result they achieve rather than the mere efforts made. However,
unless the scope of responsibility is specifically identified and carefully
delineated, it will be easy to evade accountability by either passing
the buck or simply hiding behind empty policy statements that allude
to Islamic finance principles.
93 M. Nussbaum, Martha Women and Human Development: Then Capabilities
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 135-147.
94 M. Arouri, et al, ‘Microfinance: A Powerful Tool for Human Development in
Africa’ in A. Soucat, and N. Mthuli (eds) One Billion People, One Billion
Opportunities (Tunis, African Development Bank, 2014) ch 26;S. S. Kanungo
‘Microfinance: A Tool for Human Development’ (2015) 2(2) Journal of Innovative
Professional Science & IT 78-87.
95 Accountability and obligation are integral parts of a human right model. See
Vizard et al (n 67).
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It might be necessary to codify the Islamic finance principles either
within the financial laws and guidelines or through some other avenues.
The codification must, in effect, cement Islamic microfinance principles
into the national socio-economic fabric. To aid the operation of these
principles, it is imperative to specify the parameters for its application,
the conditions that must be satisfied, the government agency
responsible, the timeframe for implementation, and standard through
which implementation efforts can be assessed.96
6.  POLICY REVIEWS FROM ISLAMIC
MICROFINANCE PERSPECTIVE
Following the effort to establish the imperativeness of Islamic
microfinance policies, this section will attempt to analyse some of the
government-funded schemes to identify how they fail to comply with
sharia principles. An attempt will also be made to explore how these
schemes could meet sharia requirements without having to overhaul
their modalities totally.
Analysis of BOI’s Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP)
Scheme
One of the micro-financing schemes funded by the national government
is the BOP. With the overall aim of enhancing financial inclusion, the
scheme aims to reduce poverty through job and wealth creation. While
the government provides the fund, the administrative services are
rendered through private MFIs. To be eligible as a channel for
administering the scheme, the MFIs must meet a certain minimum
capital adequacy, non-performance loan, and liquidity thresholds. They
must also have been in operation for not less than three years and so
forth. It is estimated that the scheme will result in the creation of at
least of 40,000 direct and 120,000 indirect jobs at an average loan
size of N250,000.00 per ultimate obligor. The interest rate from the
BOI to MFIs is set at 1.0 percent per month while the MFIs are to
charge beneficiaries 1.5 percent per month flat (all inclusive). The
tenure of the loan is two years with three months moratorium. The
96 M. Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities and Constitutional Law: ‘Perception’ against Lofty
Formalism’ (2009) 10(3) Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 341-
357.
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borrower is expected to obtain a Bank Guarantee from reputable
commercial banks.
As straightforward as this scheme might appear to be, there are
many aspects that could potentially repel an impoverished Muslim
from tapping into the ‘opportunity’. The most conspicuous of the
concerns is the requirement of interest. As already noted, to understand
why this might be such a big issue to Muslims, one just needs to
understand how much interest (riba) is abhorred in the Quran.97 The
Quran makes it clear that the one who consumes98 interest has declared
war against God!99 Such implication would surely make many poor
Muslims flee from this scheme. Moreover, the scheme requires
borrowers to obtain guarantees from commercial banks. Bank
guarantees are often issued at a fee or commission. This also offends
the tenet of Islam, firstly because of the interest element and secondly
because it involves the sale of uncertainty (gharar).100 It also contains
an element of gambling (maysir).101 It is noteworthy that while pure
loans and guarantee are not in principle forbidden in Islam, it has to
be done benevolently as any unearned increase will render such
transaction toxic. It is also noteworthy that while interest (and the
like) is forbidden, Islam promotes trade.102 Such poor Muslims are thus
more likely to view a trade or partnership arrangement more favourably.
One can only imagine how a group could be easily excluded from
benefitting from some of the estimated impact of the scheme. Moreover,
while it might be argued that there is nothing preventing the
establishment of Islamic MFIs (IMFIs) by private parties, the prevailing
97 E.g. Quran 2:275 states thus: ‘Those who consume interest cannot stand [on
the Day of Resurrection] except as one stands who is being beaten by Satan
into insanity. That is because they say, ‘Trade is [just] like interest.’ But Allah
has permitted trade and has forbidden interest. So, whoever has received an
admonition from his Lord and desists may have what is past, and his affair
rests with Allah. But whoever returns to [dealing in interest or usury] – those
are the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein.
98 ‘Consumption’ is attributed not only to the one who demands interest, but also
the one who pays it. The prophetic tradition shows that they are the same.
99 And if you do not, then be informed of a war [against you] from Allah and His
Messenger. But if you repent, you may have your principal - [thus] you do no
wrong, nor are you wronged.
100 This is contained in Quran 2:188; 4:29.
101 See Quran 2:219, 5:90, 91.
102 Quran 2:275.
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system could easily dis-incentivize prospective IMFIs. For example,
this scheme requires the MFIs to pay interest.
Clearly, to properly address the present problem, the authorities
would have to establish conditions that are free from the violations
mentioned above. However, setting out policies would not be enough.
Even this basic BOP scheme contains an element that might hamper
the full implementation of the scheme even if the eligibility criteria
were in compliance with sharia. Thus, if the proposition in this article
is adopted and public schemes have sharia-compliant variations, the
variant might be dead on arrival if some of the conditions are not
altered accordingly. For instance, one of the eligibility requirements is
that MFIs must have been in operation for three years.
It also requires that some minimum ratios are met. It might be
that only very few IMFIs would meet these requirements. Such practical
detail, which has dire consequence for financial access, can be easily
overlooked even where it appears that Islamic finance has been adopted
as a matter of state policy. An integral element of a public agent’s
duties, therefore, is to unblock and remove every conceptual and
operational hurdle that might be in the way of implementation. For
example, this might be achieved by granting concessions to newly
formed IMFIs who do not meet the 3-year benchmark. The apparent
‘special treatment’ might be necessary to ensure equitable access and
distribution. In this case, it would be wrong to insist that the same
conditions should apply to all the financial intermediaries (MFIs and
IMFIs). Equity (not equality) should be the benchmark.103
Analysis of the Nigerian Incentive-Based Risk Sharing
in Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) Loan Guarantee
Scheme
The Nigerian government recently initiated a N75 billion guarantee
scheme to facilitate the revival of the agricultural sector. The scheme
will guarantee between 30-75 per cent loans provided by Deposit
Money Banks (DPB) to farmers. The scheme enables farmers to obtain
credit by ‘integrating end-to-end agriculture value chains, such as input
producers, farmers, agro-dealers, agro-processors and industrial
manufacturers with agricultural financing value chains – loan product
103 K. Cook and K.Hegtvedt, ‘Distributive Justice, Equity, and Equality’ (1983) 9
Annual Review of Sociology 217-241.
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development, credit distribution, loan origination, managing and pricing
for risk, and loan disbursement.’104 The scheme is designed around
NIRSAL’s five pillars, with a particular focus on Risk Sharing and
Technical Assistance. The scheme is primarily aimed at changing the
behaviour of financial institutions while the benefit is targeted at
individuals in paid employment, micro (small) farmers, medium and
large-scale farmers, corporate organizations, NGOs, government, and
its agencies. In light of the overall trajectory of this article, the scheme
will be addressed to the extent that it relates to micro (small) farmers.
The expectation is that the scheme will result in increased food
production and national security, poverty reduction, employment
generation and wealth creation, empowerment of farmers and rural
households through credits and savings, strengthening the governance
structure of co-operatives and so forth.
Such a scheme truly has the potential to expand the reach of
financial services especially to otherwise excluded groups. However, it
is difficult to see how poor adherent Muslims will maximize their
capability through this scheme. The guarantee covers loans provided
by DPBs. There are about 23 DPBs in Nigeria with only one of them
being an Islamic bank and it has very limited reach compared to even
the smallest of the conventional banks. In effect, while the scheme
could in principle cover sharia-compliant transactions, many (perhaps
most) of the potential Muslim borrowers would be unable to overcome
the extra burden they might have to face – burden that would not be
encountered by their contemporaries who are willing to approach any
of the numerous branches of the 22 conventional banks.
The preceding scenario reveals the level of sensitivity needed for
government agencies to fulfil their positive obligation towards
financially excluded Muslim adherents. This is a responsibility that
cannot be compromised. In implementing this scheme, there is no
clear condition that violates the principle of Islamic finance, yet the
scheme offends the right to Islamic microfinance because it fails to
promote access to Sharia-compliant microfinance – a failure of a positive
duty arising from the fundamental right nested on the principles of
human dignity, equality/equity, and non-discrimination.
104 Jude Uzonwanne, the Head of NIRSAL Project Implementation Office under
the Development Finance Department of the CBN. See Premium Times, ‘CBN
approves N75 billion loan for agricultural lending in states, Abuja’ 13 June
2012.
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To correct the oversight, participating DPBs could be required to
administer sharia-compliant credit transactions to small businesses and
individuals who choose such avenues. If this option is considered
impractical, the government could open the scheme to MFIs who are
willing to operate sharia-compliant scheme for interested clients.
7.  CONCLUSION
There has been a continuous call for equity by key stakeholders
especially since the turn of the century. Among institutions that have
made a similar call are the United Nations, through its Human
Development Report (UNDP, 2005); and the World Bank, through its
World Development Report (2006). By and large, stakeholders and
commentators have often identified the specific need for equity in
developing countries. The reason behind the attention given to equity
is because it is considered good in its own right. Secondly, equity is a
necessary measure of development and social change. Thirdly, it is an
important instrument for reducing poverty and effecting long-term
change and social cohesiveness.
The paper has sought to establish inequity and consequential breach
of right that result from the absence of Islamic microfinance policies in
Nigeria. Particular focus was placed on the absence of sharia-compliant
avenue for government funded schemes. This article has established
the existence of people’s right to Islamic microfinance through a
constitutional analysis. It goes further to establish an equitable
economic approach (the CA), which helped to clearly substantiate the
problem with the status quo in Nigeria.
Going forward, concerted efforts should be made to develop the
modalities for operating a Sharia-compliant microfinance scheme. An
ideal starting point is to emphasize that every transaction that does
not include prohibited elements as determined by sharia is ‘Islamic’.
Therefore, from the perspective of a Muslim, a legitimate trade between
non-Muslim is Islamic while illegitimate transaction engaged in by
Muslims is un-Islamic even if it is cloaked with Arabic terms and branded
as sharia-compliant. Also, it must be noted that not all sharia-compliant
instruments and methods will be sustainable and suitable for every
situation and location. For this reason, it would be necessary to conduct
an ethnographic research of Muslim communities/households to get a
sense of the most suitable instruments and methods for the Nigerian
market.
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That said, it is worthy to mention broadly that Islamic microfinance
may be developed on a non-profit or for-profit basis.105 It could also be
on the basis of a composite model that combines profit and non-profit
elements.106 In general, experience in other countries indicates a
preference for three specific instruments: murabahah, mudarabah and
qardhasan.107 The suitability of any model will depend on the end
sought, the circumstance, and the parties involved.
Murabaha microfinance is a trade transaction whereby a potential
beneficiary approaches bank with the intention of obtaining certain
commodities, i.e., the customer needs a tractor for his farm to expand.
The bank reviews the request taking account of all the risk factors. If
they are satisfied, the bank buys the tractor and sells to the customer
at an agreed price, which is usually higher than the cost price. The
bank’s profit is the margin between the cost price and the sale price.
Parties can then agree on a repayment plan. The sale price must not be
subject to upward or downward review, and it must be clear that
ownership of the commodity has been transferred to the customer. It
is permissible to provide collateral. However, the reality in many cases
is that the person in need of microfinance will hardly possess the
required collateral. While such a person can obtain a guarantee, it would
not be acceptable to purchase such credit guarantee. A viable option
that has been deployed is only to extend such credit sale to members
of recognized groups whereby group members jointly guarantee each
other.108 Such transaction is valid so long as the underlying commodity
is not prohibited and the terms meet the requirement of effort, risk,
and reward.109
Some of the microfinance arrangements in Nigeria can be easily
modified to fit with the murabaha model. For example, some loan
providers do not hand over the loan amount to clients. Rather, they
purchase the commodity and then convert its value to the loan amount.
105 See generally M. Obaidullah, Introduction to Islamic Microfinance (IBF Net,
2008).
106 B. Shafique, ‘Models of Islamic Microfinance’ (2013) Global Islamic Finance
Report ch 11.
107 R. Dhumale, and A Sapcanin, An Application of Islamic Banking Principles to
Microfinance: Technical Note (UNDP, 1999).
108 See Obaidullah (n 106).
109 For the sharia requirements of Islamic finance, see S. A. Rosly, Critical Issue on
Islamic Banking and Financial Markets (Bloomington, Authorhouse, 2005).
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With their experience in the commodity market, such organization can
be engaged in operationalizing a murabaha model. The credit risk may
be mitigated by requiring the applicant to provide a third-party
guarantee (e.g. group guarantee) and post-dated cheques.110
The government agencies can easily adapt the mudarabah
(partnership) model. Typically, the BOA already applies some loan
eligibility criteria that would have enabled them to gain a level of
expertise required for the partnership arrangement. The BOA scheme
requires applicants to open an account with them. They also require
that the account must be functional for at least three months. Also,
applicants would have to keep proper daily farm records. The bank
official will also interview applicants who would have to display proper
knowledge of their section of the agricultural sector and must be fully
conversant with their farm. The bank officials will then visit the
applicant’s farm to assess the suitability of the grant.
With the level of experience explained above, there is no reason
why BOA should not maintain a scheme that allows for them to act as
the Rub ul Mal (fund provider) while the applicant acts as the mudarib
(entrepreneur) within a partnership arrangement. The credit guarantee
scheme may mitigate the risk element for BOA. The risk borne by the
BOA could also be reflected in the profit sharing ratio between the
parties. Similarly, in its engagements with IMFIs regarding the BOP
scheme, the BOI engage in a musharaka or mudaraba arrangement
rather than extending the fund as loans. Such IMFI as the active partner
can then engage in a credit sale on a murabaha basis with beneficiaries.
Sceptics might be unsure about the viability of such microfinancing
arrangement, but experience in other countries alludes to the
soundness of Islamic microfinance models. For example, a scheme
funded by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) in the Guinea Republic
shows the relevance of Islamic microfinance to human development.
Many of the people who engaged in the scheme would not have
considered conventional loans at all.111 Working in partnership with
local MFIs, IsDB was able to enlighten the people about the available
opportunity. The scheme was particularly successful because of the
110 The Sudanese Bank used this approach successfully. See Islamic Research and
Training Institute, Islamic Social Finance Report 2015, 95.
111 IsDB, ‘Microfinance makes Businesses Successful in Guinea’ (May 2013) 13
Success Stories Series, 2.
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ability of these MFIs to reach out to the public through media channels
primarily the radio.
Parallel to embedding Islamic microfinance principles into
governance practice, it is equally important that all stakeholders enhance
the prospect of Islamic microfinance in Nigeria by engaging closely
with community leaders and religious scholars who would be
instrumental in convincing the people as to the permissibility of such
funding avenues.
It is hoped that the paper will signal the beginning of a drive
towards deepening human development while at the same time paying
attention to the socio-economic balance in the country.
